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1. did not know whether prior to the war there existed any plans in Czechoslovakia for the erection of hydrogenation plants utilizing the Fischer-Tropsch process, but improbable since Czechoslovakia can be supplied from the Rumanian oil fields at moderate prices and low freight rates.
 2. This situation did not change until Hitler won the Sudeten district and, in the course of the war, gained control over the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia. At first the erection of synthesizing plants was not planned, but within the framework of the second four-year plan, work was begun in 1938 on the construction, somewhere near Bruex, of a large plant for the production of fuel by means of the I.G. Farben hydrogenation process. Out of this hydrogenation plant grew a need for a synthesizing plant.
 3. The original plan for the hydrogenation plant provided for a yearly production of about 700,000 tons of fuel at the plant. (1) This hydrogenation plant had the following installations:
 - a. A carbonization plant with 80 large carbonizers for circulation of gases (Spuelgasschweler). To this installation was attached a large plant producing gas to be pumped over great distances (Druckferngasverpugung). The latter plant had an annual capacity of up to 300x10⁶ cubic meters. (2)
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- b. A gas production installation with units each having a capacity of 22,000 cubic meters of pure water gas per hour; an installation for decomposition of air (Luftzerlegung) with ten Linde apparatus each producing 3,000 cubic meters of oxygen per hour. These installations had equipment for pressure conversion, compressed-carbon acid washing, compression, and high-pressure carbonic-oxide cleaning.
- c. Installation for the actual hydrogenation. (3) This had a contact plant and an apparatus for distillation and hydrogenation under pressure (DHD-Fabrik i.e. Druckhydrierung und Destillation).
- d. Processing plant with alcacide and soda lye washing facilities, gas cleaning, gas decomposition (Gaszerlegung) for the production of ether, and stabilization equipment.
- e. Installation processing waste water for the production of phenol and ammonia.
- f. Plant laboratory.
- g. "A-T" gasoline plant for the production of high-quality gasoline from isobutane.
- h. Steam and power generating plant, utilizing crushed coal and coke and equipped with a water supply for the steam.
4. The construction of the hydrogenation plant was started in 1939; the plant went into production as early as July 1942 with 30 percent of its total planned capacity. This capacity had been increased to as much as 70 percent by 12 May 1944, when the first air raid took place. (5)
5. The coke problem had not been sufficiently heeded when the hydrogenation plant was planned. It was a well-known fact that the coke obtained as a by-product of the plant was not suited for use in foundries without special processing. However, it was hoped to make some of this coke usable by mixing it with high-grade coke from other places and to sell the bulk of the by-product coke for use in gas-producers and for domestic use. But all three of these plans proved fruitless. The buyers of industrial coal refused to have the quality of the good coke lowered by such an admixture. The conversion of motor vehicles from the conventional gas-operated method to the coke-burning method did not make the desired progress, chiefly because the armed forces refused to use coke-burning vehicles. The sale of coke for domestic use also made only very slow progress. Consequently, soon after production had been started, coke dumps began to build up, and the utilization of these became a constant worry. Another problem arose from the fact that the construction of the actual hydrogenation installation was not proceeding rapidly enough to enable the plant to convert into gasoline the medium oil which it had produced. The sale of this surplus medium oil as Diesel oil, however, was very difficult because of its poor quality. A possible solution to both of these problems was the erection of a synthesizing plant employing the Fischer-Tropsch method, for such a plant could use the surplus coke and could produce an excellent medium oil. Plans for such a plant were passed on as far as the central economic planning agency in Germany but were not accepted there. Subsequently experiments were made with gazifying the residual coke immediately after the coal had been degassed in the Lurgi gas-carbonizers. These experiments, however, were interrupted by the continuous air raids beginning after May 1944. These air raids solved the coke problem in an unforeseen way, since it was not possible to attain a production of over 10 percent of the capacity.

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6. This was the situation when the Soviets arrived. The plant was considered war booty, and at first an order was issued **that it produce as much gasoline as possible** irrespective of economic considerations. About a week after the occupation, a commission of four persons from the Soviet Mineral Oil Staff arrived from Moscow, and the studies of the plant's actual and potential production had to be submitted without delay. The Czechs also showed great interest in the hydrogenation plant, and after about five weeks the plant was turned over to the Czechs as reparations. The Soviets had in the meanwhile probably realized that it would not pay to transfer the heavily damaged plant to another place.
7. After a long period of deliberation it was finally decided that the hydrogenation plant be reconstructed so as to have up to 25 percent of its previous capacity. The plant's DHD installation was to be rebuilt but not its gasoline producing facilities. A synthesizing plant was to be built for the direct processing of 500,000 tons of coke, and furnaces of the hydrogenation plant were to be converted for this purpose. All installations not needed for the execution of these plans were to be used for the production of nitrogen.
8. At the same time another synthesizing project was being discussed at the Czech Ministry of Industry. The coking plant erected near Kladno about 1937 had been originally designed to produce each year about 100,000 tons of foundry coke for use especially by the Poldi Foundry. This coking plant was to use coal produced in Moravska-Ostrava mining area. After the plant had been put into operation, it was found that the coke was unsuitable for the use originally planned. During the war the coke had been utilized for other purposes, but after the war no use could be found for it. The Ministry of Defense had preliminary plans drawn up for utilizing this coke in a Fischer-Tropsch type synthesizing installation connected with the coke plant. It appeared, however, that the operation of the coke plant would be a rather costly affair because of its small capacity and the high freight charges paid on its coal supply. It was therefore suggested that the coke plant with its synthesizing installation be transferred to the Moravska-Ostrava coal district and that it be enlarged accordingly. This plan was passed on to the Czech Ministry of Industry.
9. [] the original plans for the reconstruction of the Bruex plant were sound, under Czech management the plant proved to be so uneconomical that it eventually had to call for a work force of 2,000 German specialists and skilled workers plus 2,000 Czechs. The Czech management insisted on attaching two or three Czechs to each German until, with the overstaffing in the administrative and planning offices, the Bruex plant had over 10,000 employees. Because of similar conditions in the mining industry, the price of coal rose more than 200 percent, but in the end the price of coke had to be reduced in order to make it possible to sell the coke at all. Also contributing to the failure of the Bruex project were the several explosions in the gas producing plant, the burning out of the carbonization plants, and the leakages in the high-pressure plants. These [] were the result of improper care and occurred particularly after the German specialists had been expelled. Gasoline rose from a competitive price of about 3 Czech Crowns to about 56 Czech Crowns. Finally the hydrogenation plant in Bruex was shut down and offered for sale, and the synthesizing project connected with this plant was abandoned. [] not heard anything of the Moravska-Ostrava project since that time, and [] suspects that this project had the same fate as the Bruex plant. Later, after the sale of the Bruex plant had proved impossible, the plant was put into operation again at about 12 percent of its capacity. [] this was probably for the sake of prestige. (6)

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10. [] in 1946 the annual Czechoslovakian requirements of liquid fuels and lubricating oils amounted to about 600,000 tons, 10 percent of which could be supplied by domestic sources. (7) The realization of the Bruex project would have meant that a little less than 40 percent of the requirements could have been met. [] despite past failure, the Bruex plant could be a national asset, for under German management a 50 percent utilization of the plant capacity proved an economic success.

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Comments.

- (1) See attachment.
- (2) It was originally planned that the installation producing gas to be pumped over long distances would be completed in three stages. At these three stages the annual output was to be respectively 10×10^6 , 80×10^6 and 140×10^6 cubic meters of city gas (Stadtgas). The first stage was completed at the close of the war, the second stage was nearing completion in 1945/1946. According to the Czech press, the installation was to be completed by late 1948, at which time the annual rate of production would be 125 million cubic meters. The following places are connected to the long-distance gas line: Komotau, Bruex, Teplitz-Schoenau, Dux, Aussig, Leitmeritz, Lobositz, Bodenbach, Tetschen, Warnsdorf, Rumburg, Reichenberg, Gablonz, Prague; Prague was connected to the line in October 1947.
- (3) The hydrogenation plant was designed to have eventually a total annual output of 1 million tons of gasoline. A pipe-line connects the hydrogenation plant to the fuel storage depots of Hnevice near Raudnitz.
- (4) The power plant not only supplies current to the plant itself but also supplies additional power to the network of the Middle-Bohemian power plants (Ervenice/Seestadt), the network of the North-Bohemian power stations (Bokolov/Falkenau), and to the network of the former North-Bohemian lignite mines.
- (5) According to previous information the maximum production attained prior to the beginning of the air raids amounted to 1,700 tons of fuel per day; this would mean about 500,000 tons per year or about 70 percent of the expected capacity.
- (6) For early 1946 an output of about 700 tons of fuel per day was reported for the Bruex plant. The target at that time was reportedly a daily production of 1,200 tons. Available information indicates that this target had not been reached by the fall of 1950, when the daily output was estimated at between 800 and 1,000 tons, which is equivalent to an annual output of from 250,000 to 300,000 tons. Apart from the partial repair of war damages and the expansion of the plant producing gas to be pumped over long distances and the long-distance pipe line, no other expansion work has been carried out at the hydrogenation plant in Bruex/Oberleutensdorf (Most/Zaluzi).
- (7) Since, as of the fall of 1950, the annual import of mineral oils and derivatives was about 200,000 to 300,000 tons and the country's own production of mineral oil only 50,000 to 60,000 tons per year, the requirements could not be met and economy measures were therefore necessary.

1 Annex: 1 - Production plan of Bruex plant.

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